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The South Pacific is home to the world’s largest and most valuable tuna fishery. 
Despite this, the Pacific island countries have found it tremendously difficult to 
capture significant economic rents from the resource. It is argued in this paper that 
poor economic policy partly explains this. However, poor policies are preventing the 
implementation of strong, cost-effective institutions for the governance of the fishery 
which, coupled with strong institutions for broad social and economic governance, are 
required for development of the industry. Opportunities for policy reform that is likely 
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  11. Introduction 
 
The negotiation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 
(which was not ratified until 1994) substantially increased the responsibility of 
resource-adjacent governments to manage and conserve fish stocks within their 
exclusive economic zone, the ocean area within 200 miles of their coastline (United 
Nations 1994). This increased responsibility is no more extreme than for the Pacific 
island countries, whose waters are home to the world’s largest and most valuable tuna 
fishery, and where ocean area of jurisdiction exceeds landmass by an average factor 
of 300 to 1 (World Bank 2000) (see Figure 1).  The Pacific island countries, and 
indeed most developing countries, have found it tremendously difficult to convert 
these tenured rights into concrete economic gains.  
 
It is widely understood that, unless controls are placed on fishing effort, the fishery is 
susceptible to the problems associated with open-access arrangements: over-
exploitation and over-capitalisation (Gordon 1954). At this level of use, only normal 
profits are made since greater than normal profits would encourage greater resource 
exploitation, and no resource rents are derived from the fishery. Hence, control must 
be placed on fishing effort. Determining the most cost-effective institutional 
framework (the framework of humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction (North 1991)) for exercising this control is hotly 
debated amongst economists and other social scientists. In the governance of fishery 
resources and indeed the governance of all natural resources, it is helpful to consider 
institutions of three types: property rights (the nature of an entity holding rights of 
decision-making within the hierarchy of resource management), entitlement systems 
(the basis for defining shares or parts of the fishery belonging to the right holder, e.g., 
input versus output controls), and mechanisms for allocating and adjusting resource 
entitlements (procedures of allocating and adjusting entitlements can be either market- 
or administratively-based). 
[Figure 1] 
The past couple of decades has been a period of intense learning for policy analysts, 
both within governments and within multinational organisations that have made loans 
contingent upon particular reforms being enacted. This learning has revealed the 
importance of open trade, macroeconomic balance, flexible labour markets, a limited 
role of government in production of goods and services, and an expanding role for the 
private sector in many activities long though to be the province of government. More 
recently, there has developed an appreciation that without the institutions essential to 
the operation of the private sector, these policy objectives will not be achieved 
(Duncan et al. 1999). Historically, policies of Pacific island governments have been 
characterised by heavy protection against imports, inflexible labour markets, large 
public sectors and poorly developed institutional arrangements to support private 
sector activities. However, this picture is changing with greater experience and an 
understanding of the benefits of ‘market-friendly’ institutions and policies. 
 
This improved climate for investment within the Pacific island countries provides a 
strengthened foundation for fisheries development in the region. However, 
determining optimal fisheries policies and institutional structures for governance of a 
fishery is notoriously difficult due to the dynamics of the biology of the fishery and 
fish prices, and the large and long-term nature of investments. Governance of the 
South Pacific tuna fishery is particularly difficult due to the multiple species of tuna, 
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migration of tuna beyond the Pacific island nations’ exclusive economic zones into 
wide stretches of the open seas, and the different gear types in use. Despite the 
complexity of the fishery, governance should still be founded on sound economic 
principles. 
 
The primary aim of this paper is to draw attention to areas of poor fisheries policy in 
Pacific island countries, to highlight the flaws in arguments resulting in these poor 
policies, and to show how these poor policy objectives have led to sub-optimal 
institutions for governance of the resource. A secondary aim of this paper is to show 
that a sound policy environment alone is unlikely to lead to sustainable economic 
development of the South Pacific tuna fishery. Sound economic policy must be 
coupled with strong institutions for broader social and economic coordination: 
security of property and contractual rights, an honest and competent bureaucracy and 
a reliable and independent judiciary. The paper proceeds in Section 2 with a 
discussion of fisheries policy in the South Pacific, highlighting principles of economic 
theory that are largely misunderstood or ignored. Section 2 also includes an 
exposition on sound policy reform. Section 3 explores the necessity of sound policy 
for the adoption of appropriate institutions for governance of a natural resource, using 
the South Pacific tuna fishery as an example. Section 4 stresses the overwhelming 
importance of strong institutions for broader economic governance without which 
individual sectors in an economy (including the fisheries sector of Pacific island 
economies) will not fully develop. 
 
2.  Fisheries policy in the South Pacific  
 
The Pacific island countries have long sought to increase their share of economic 
rents from the South Pacific tuna fishery. Their struggle started towards the end of the 
1970s when they first attempted to extract access fees from Japan, and continued into 
the 1980s when United States fleets entered the fishery. It wasn’t until the end of the 
1980s when some Pacific island countries started establishing access arrangements 
with Soviet fishing companies did the Pacific island countries have sufficient weight 
to charge these fees (Schurman 1998). Later, the heightened presence of Korean and 
Taiwanese fleets (along with other minor fleets) increased competition for access, 
giving the Pacific island countries the ability to increase access fees. 
 
Now, 10 distant water fishing nations (and nine Pacific island nations) fish in the 
South Pacific, harvesting approximately 86 percent of catch (mainly Japan, the 
Taiwanese province of China, South Korea and the United States of America) (SPC 
2000). Pacific island countries negotiate access fees in the order of four percent of 
gross revenue for the right to fish in their exclusive economic zones, although the 
percentage varies across distant water fishing nations (Table 1). It is evident from a 
number of studies that higher access fees could be generated in a competitive 
environment, although there are large discrepancies between estimates. Bertignac et 
al. (2001) argue that the fishery rent is around 13 percent of gross revenue at 1996 
levels of effort, and if effort level and the fleet structure of the fishery were optimised 
it could be close to 40 percent. Gillett, Preston and Associates (2000a) estimate 
fishery rents for the Papua New Guinean tuna fishery to be between 10 and 22 percent 
for purse-seine vessels and between 17 and 31 percent for longline vessels, depending 
on the specific vessel technology. It seems that the most appropriate form of access 
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(or expected to be earned) from the fishery. It measures the difference between the 
value of the catch and the economic cost of the fishing effort. It is very difficult to 
estimate the cost of fishing effort, so it is difficult to know whether the access fees 
charged by Pacific island countries in any way approximate the true resource rents. 
[Table 1] 
In reaction to the meager returns from access fees, Pacific island governments 
adopted a new strategy in the 1990s of trying to force domestication of the industry in 
the belief that they could duplicate distant water fishing nation activities to yield 
greater benefits from the fishery. This domestication came in a range of forms varying 
from large-scale public investments in fishing vessels, to public investment in 
aeroplanes, port infrastructure and bases from which tuna can be processed for 
shipping. Many of the region’s governments have invested many millions of dollars 
of aid funds and public revenues into this domestication. These investments were 
made with government as sole owner and operator, or in joint ventures with foreign 
countries (predominantly Japan and the United States).
1 Unfortunately, all the 
investments that have been operating for more than two years, with only a few minor 
exceptions, have failed financially, some repeatedly. Due to the pressing need for 
employment and foreign exchange, some public sector investments have been 
sustained despite their financial losses, receiving massive injections of additional 
public funds. 
 
The government of the Federated States of Micronesia has made the greatest effort 
toward domestication, investing over US$120 million
2 by 1995 through state-owned 
fishing enterprises (The National Fisheries Corporation, The Caroline Fishing 
Corporation, the Yap Fishing Corporation and Wespac). All enterprises have been 
operating at a loss (Schurman 1998). Other examples of unsuccessful public 
operations include Solomon Taiyo Limited in the Solomon Islands, Te Mautari Ltd in 
Kiribati and two purse-seiner joint ventures between the Marshall Islands and the 
United States of America (the latter requiring US$15 million from the government of 
the Marshall Islands).  
 
Private investment in tuna ventures has been minor compared with public investment. 
However, most have proved successful. Private ventures in Fiji, the Cook Islands and 
Tonga show promise. Improved economic conditions in Samoa resulting from 
reforms aimed at encouraging private sector development, amongst other things, have 
lead to the growth of domestically-owned fishing companies. This is evidence that 
fishing activities can develop without government support providing there exists a 
secure investment environment. 
 
2.1  The theory of comparative advantage 
 
Duncan et al. (1999) argue that while the theory of comparative advantage is one of a 
few economic theories that can be proven to be true and nontrivial, it is frequently 
misunderstood by policy-makers. The theory of comparative advantage states that any 
economy will be most productive when it specialises in production of those goods and 
services that it does relatively “best”. While a country may have absolute advantage in 
production of all goods and services (it can produce at an absolutely lower cost than 
other countries), no country has comparative advantage in all goods due to the 
differences in the relative costs of production. Hence, even the smallest and poorest 
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techniques for directly measuring a country’s comparative advantage, as it requires 
the knowledge of pre-trade relative prices that are unobservable. The literature 
focuses on indirect techniques of measurement, of which the most common is 
‘revealed’ comparative advantage where trade patterns are used to reveal comparative 
advantage (Balassa 1965). 
 
It is a natural inclination to try to directly determine the industries in which a country 
has comparative advantage. However, Duncan et al. (1999) note that comparative 
advantage is too fluid and too complex for governments to impose a decree in favour 
of the development of certain industries. While it is not appropriate for governments 
to try to select industries in which their country has comparative advantage, 
government has an overwhelming responsibility to create an environment where 
private agents can use information efficiently to search out areas of comparative 
advantage. This process involves providing the economic policies and institutional 
framework needed for efficiently functioning markets. 
 
Pacific island country governments have been assuming their country has comparative 
advantage in the fisheries sector by investing substantial public funds in the industry, 
with generally disastrous results. It is tempting to assume that due to the vastness of 
the resource, the close proximity to fishing grounds (and hence, lower freight costs), 
the low cost of labour and the lack of other natural resources in the region, 
development of the fishing sector must produce greater benefits than other sectors in 
the economy. However, the tuna industry is characterised by extremely high risk, 
costs and skill requirements. It is not conceivable that Pacific island countries can 
determine comparative advantage in this industry. Further, McCoy and Gillett (1997) 
note that at 1997 fish prices, only the Japanese and United States foreign purse seine 
operators in the South Pacific were profitable; the Taiwanese Province of China was 
just breaking even, and the Republic of Korea was incurring net losses in their 
operations. 
 
The Asian Development Bank (1997) advances the following determinants of the 
public investment failures in fisheries projects in the South Pacific: inadequate 
management, weak direction at the board level (usually composed of civil servants), 
inappropriate government operating procedures, low labour productivity, deteriorating 
prices, shortages of fish, and comparatively high-cost operations. The first four 
determinants are typical problems associated with government involvement in 
business activities. There is no reason for this kind of government involvement as 
may be necessary in land-based business activities in the region where property rights 
to land are insecure and, hence, where government backing of some kind is required. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea allocated strong state property 
rights to resource use for the ocean area within 200 miles of a country’s coastline. 
Governments can allocate resource entitlements to resource use in the exclusive 
economic zones knowing that there can be no future claim for compensation by right-
holders. Maintaining public investment in the tuna industry is likely to result in 
continued financial losses at the expense of forgone opportunities for the private 
sector. Grynberg (1997) notes that the opportunity cost to the Solomon Islands of the 
poor performance of Solomon Taiyo Limited (STL) (a tuna harvesting and canning 
joint venture created in 1973 between the government of the Solomon Islands and a 
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effect the development potential of the Solomon Island’s main natural resource.
3 
 
2.2  The Tinbergen Principle 
 
While the theory of comparative advantage is one principle of economics that is often 
misunderstood or ignored, the Tinbergen Principle is another. Jan Tinbergen, who 
won the Nobel Prize in economics in 1969, developed the principle that the number of 
policy instruments should match the number of policy objectives (Tinbergen 1952). If 
one policy instrument is used to achieve more than one policy objective, none of the 
objectives will be achieved efficiently. Many Pacific island countries are trying to 
achieve the two policy objectives of maximising economic rents and establishing 
domestic-based industry through the one policy instrument of directly encouraging 
foreign direct investment to base locally. Such poor policy-making achieves neither 
goal well. The amount of the effective public subsidy paid out in the form of low-cost 
access and in exemptions from taxes is unknown. As only a few local activities have 
been financial successes, experience has shown that these public subsidies have been 
dissipated to create a few, likely short-term, jobs. For example, public subsidies have 
been given to several longlining companies by the Marshall Islands’ government to 
use the Island’s port facility. Although some local income has been generated, 
Schurman (1998) notes that the multiplier effects have been few. Some employment 
has been created in the on-shore processing facility, however, the Chinese boats rely 
exclusively on their own fishing crews. As profits are minimal, little is spent on local 
consumption goods and services and most is sent home to help their families.  
 
Gillett, Preston and Associates (2000a) analysed the benefits that flow to the economy 
from domestication of the industry. They note that “both Yap and Pohnpei (States of 
the Federated States of Micronesia) have lost millions of dollars through their 
attempts to establish viable purse-seine operations. … With the benefit of hindsight it 
is possible to see that both States would have been better off if they had adopted the 
lower risk strategy of collecting access fees from distant water fishing fleets. To date 
most attempts to establish purse-seine fisheries have been government-run or 
sponsored, and nearly all have failed. Gillett, Preston and Associates (2000a) continue 
by saying that “quite often high access fees paid by foreign fishing fleets deliver a 
higher level of domestic value added at less risk to an economy than costly attempts 
to establish a local fleet.” 
 
The Tinbergen Principle was also violated when the Forum Fishery Agency member 
countries banned transshipment at sea in June 1993 in a bid to increase port activity, 
and monitor fish mortality. While the latter reason is admirable, compulsory port 
transshipment is a very high-cost way of encouraging local economic activity 
generally leading to only a limited domestication of activities. Furthermore, the 
willingness-to-pay for licence fees by distant water fishing nations will decrease to 
cover these transaction costs. Duncan and Temu (1997) note that effectively the 
Pacific island countries themselves are paying for transshipment through a reduction 
in access fees. From figures presented in Gillett et al. (2001) access fees received by 
the region decreased from four percent to three percent of gross revenue. This decease 
could be attributable to the transshipment costs. The merits and costs of transshipment 
should be analysed solely on its role in harvest monitoring. If its benefits from harvest 
monitoring do not outweigh this loss of access fees, the ban should be lifted. 
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2.3  Policy reform – where to know? 
 
In support of earlier statements that many policy analysts do not understand the theory 
of comparative advantage, many foreign consultants, advisors and aid donors are 
encouraging Pacific island countries to pursue their current policy of forcing 
domestication of the industry through concentrating on the transshipment and 
servicing end of the industry where profits seem most likely
4, through encouraging 
the development of the domestic longline industry (which is less cost intensive than 
the purse-seine industry) and through encouraging domestic-based investment in tuna 
processing. However, experience and economic theory show us that this is simply 
poor policy advice. The amount of effective public subsidies is unknown, and are 
likely to be dissipated with limited domestication of activities and likely financial 
failure. 
 
A far less risky policy option is for Pacific island governments to focus on 
maximising resource rents derived from access fees from both distant water fishing 
nations and local fishing nations, and re-orienting government spending of the 
revenue into indirect support of the domestic market. The Asian Development Bank 
(1997) argues that the lack of private investment in tuna ventures is due to the 
protected and internationally un-competitive nature of Pacific island countries, 
evidence of consistent government failures in the industry and the comparatively 
high-cost, high-risk, high-skill requirements of the industry. By removing itself from 
direct investment in the industry and instead directing public funds into governance, 
institutional strengthening, broad policy change and in investment in education, an 
overall economic environment conducive to private investment will be created. Such 
an environment will help private agents to use information efficiently to search out 
areas of comparative advantage. If any Pacific island country has comparative 
advantage in the tuna industry, private tuna ventures will develop without direct 
government support.  
 
This advice is widely criticised by fishery managers in the Pacific islands region for a 
number of reasons. First, Pacific island countries depend heavily on bilateral aid 
provided by distant water fishing nations in exchange for cheap access. Fisheries 
ministers gain much public support when announcing aid packages (i.e., the funding 
of infrastructure or hospitals) that have been negotiated as part of the access 
agreements. Much of this aid has been used in direct support of the domestic fishing 
industry, in many cases with poor results. For example, Japan donated a 
transshipment port to Majuro in the Marshall Islands which was empty for close to a 
decade due to a lack of a domestic fleet and foreign boats to service (Schurman 1998). 
Because the true value of the resource rent is unknown, the value of the public 
subsidy (in the form of forgone access fees) in exchange for this overseas assistance is 
not known. There is a lack of political will to resist accepting these side payments in 
exchange for cheap access, which is understandable given the dependence of the 
Pacific island countries on the aid and access fees. Moreover, introducing new and 
transparent policies and institutions that will maximise the access fees and improve 
the economic environment for private investment risks some distant water fishing 
nations boycotting the fishery or the restricting of imports of canned tuna by 
boycotting nations. In response to this criticism, competition for access to the fishery 
is increasing with the European Union and other distant water fishing nations seeking 
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increases. It is likely that boycotting countries would re-enter the fishery and lift 
restrictions on imports of canned tuna in time. This change in policy would require 
strong political will but is likely to result in significant economic benefits in time. The 
pace of domestication should not be forced. Enhancing capabilities in the fishing 
sector will take time.  
 
A second criticism of this advice stems from the pressing need in Pacific island 
countries for job creation. This need leads to the exchange of cheap (or free) access in 
the exchange for domestic-based activities. However, it was argued earlier that often 
these subsidies are dissipated with only limited domestic job creation.  
 
A third criticism of this policy advice relates to this need for strong economic and 
social governance. While economic benefits from the fishery should be invested 
productively, they are often dissipated through wasteful consumption expenditure and 
poor quality investments. This causes frustration within members of the fishing 
industry and the wider community as the benefits from access fees are strongly 
dependent on the decisions government makes. This ‘resource curse’ is widely 
discussed in the literature (e.g. Auty 1993). With poor use of fishing revenue comes 
the temptation to require that a proportion of access fees be invested back into the 
fishery, a temptation enhanced by the need to generate foreign exchange to pay for 
imports. Weak governance and the high cost to society of unemployment should not 
be used as excuses for subsidising domestically-based industry. Such problems need 
to be addressed at their roots (i.e., improved transparency).  Using them as excuses for 
subsidising domestic industry only increases the risk of another failed public fishing 
investment in the Pacific.  
 
3.  Economic policy and institutions for sector development 
 
A sound policy environment is fundamental for determining the most cost-effective 
institutions for governance of individual sectors in an economy. The recent policy 
objective of directly encouraging domestication of the fishing industry has led to the 
development of sub-optimal institutions for governance of the Pacific islands’ 
fisheries.
5 Consider first the institution of property rights. Some of the Pacific island 
governments have chosen to allocate private-property rights for their longline fishery 
to local fishers only, with the objective of forcing domestication of the industry. In 
Papua New Guinea, little fresh investment has resulted and the catching capacity of 
the current domestic fleets remains far below what the fishery can sustain. This 
banning of foreign vessels is simply a public subsidy, the size of which is unknown 
but substantial. Gillett, Preston and Associates (2000b) suggest that the investment 
that has occurred was encouraged through other policy improvements such as 
currency devaluation and a change in fiscal policy to reduce taxes in the sector. 
 
Moreover, many of these countries are not charging access fees to the domestic fleets. 
Gillett, Preston and Associates (2000b) argue that a resource rent tax is simply a 
transfer payment from the resource user to the government and provided the money is 
spent in the country, the economic benefit may be little different if the transfer is not 
made. However, as the fishery resource is a common-property good, any company 
exploiting these resources should pay the state for that right. Hence, by not charging 
domestic vessels for access, the government is in essence assuming fishers rather than 
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effectively ignoring the theory of comparative advantage. Local fishing companies 
have had ample time to develop. For long-term investment and growth of the industry 
it is important that these fisheries are opened to foreign firms, and that access fees are 
charged to foreign and local investors. 
 
Consider now the institution of entitlement allocation. The current allocation 
institution is administrative allocation through international treaty. Duncan and Temu 
(1997) and Petersen (2002) note that these treaties are not transparent give incentives 
to under-report, and do not ensure the most efficient fishers are allocated the access 
rights. They have recommended the auctioning of fishing entitlement for a time 
period (say 5 – 10 years) on a number of grounds: 
•  Auctions tax fishers the full resource rent without having to know its true value 
(only limited knowledge is required to set a reserve price); 
•  Auctions transfer risk from Pacific island countries to fishing companies and 
therefore improve fiscal stability; 
•  Auctions increase transparency through reducing opportunities for direct dealing 
with individuals; 
•  Auctions increase competition by reducing the transaction costs of entry; 
•  Auctions encourage self-enforcement and self-monitoring; and 
•  Auctions eliminate incentives for under-reporting. 
Because the two policy objectives of encouraging domestication and maximising 
economic rents from the fishery are trying to be achieved through the one policy 
instrument of directly encouraging foreign direct investment to base locally (in 
violation of the Tinbergen Principle), sub-optimal institutions aimed at achieving 
these objectives have been implemented. Institutions aimed at achieving the policy of 
maximising resource rents from the fishery (for example, the auctioning of fishing 
rights) cannot be implemented as these countries are encouraging foreign direct 
investment to base locally with the incentive of cheaper access. If it is considered 
worthy to subsidise domestic activities, subsidies should be transparent, not hidden as 
is currently the case with cheap access arrangements. 
 
4.  The over-whelming importance of strong institutions for broad economic 
governance 
 
Good economic policy and strong institutions for the governance of a fishery are two 
factors necessary for fisheries development. The cod fishery is an example of where 
the absence of these two factors led to the collapse of the fishery (Grafton et al. 2000). 
However, these factors are not sufficient and alone are unlikely to lead to sustainable 
fisheries development in the Pacific. The strengthening of economic policies and 
institutions for governance of the South Pacific tuna fishery must be coupled with the 
broader strengthening of economic policies and institutions for social and economic 
governance. 
 
Since Matthews’ presidential speech in 1986 (Matthews 1986), economists and other 
social scientists have become increasingly aware of the importance of institutions for 
economic growth. Olson (1996) emphasised this importance in his Distinguished 
Lecture on Economics in Government. He argues that the only plausible explanation 
for the great differences in the wealth of nations is the difference in the quality of their 
institutions and economic policies. Olson suggests that “big bills” can only be picked 
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incentives. 
 
Toatu (2001) compared three explanations of the poor performance of the Kiribati 
economy during the 1980s and 1990s: the neoclassical approach, the policy approach 
and the institutional approach. He found that the lack of economic growth had little to 
do with the lack of natural or capital resources, nor did it have much to do with poor 
policies. Rather the lack of incentives to accumulate and acquire those resources, and 
to formulate good policies was the important factor. This brings to bear the 
importance of institutions in providing these incentives. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the nexus between economic policy, institutions and economic and 
social outcomes. Institutions provide the incentive structure that, together with the 
transaction costs of the institutions and the general functioning of the state, determine 
the social and economic performance of the economy. Institutions are of two types: 
informal norms and traditions that are determined by culture; and formal rules and 
laws that are imposed by the state for social and economic coordination. State-
endorsed institutions are designed to achieve state-endorsed policy. The formal 
institutions function on a number of levels. For simplicity, these institutions are 
presented in Figure 2 on two levels: broad institutions for economic and social 
governance, and specific institutions for sector governance. The literature generally 
cites broad institutions for social and economic governance as the security of property 
and contractual rights, a competent and honest bureaucracy, and a reliable and 
independent judiciary. In the absence of these institutions, the full potential of natural 
and capital resources cannot be realised and private investors do not have the security 
to invest and apply their skills and technology.  
 
A great advantage of the off-shore fishing industry is that the property rights structure 
for the exclusive economic zones has been well defined. Hence, the property rights 
are not subject to compensation claims, a rapidly growing business in other sectors in 
Melanesia (Chand 2001). Moreover, foreign direct investment does not need to be 
made in joint ventures with the state. Hence, market institutions that allow voluntary 
exchange and specialisation need not be impeded by poorly defined property rights, 
which is the major concern for so many developing countries. However, the 
contractual rights for local and distant water fishing nations must be secured by 
government and protected and enforced by the judiciary. 
 
Bureaucrats require appropriate incentives for them to carry out their required tasks 
efficiently, effectively, responsively, with clear strategic focus and appropriate 
participation. A lack of, or inappropriate, incentives are likely to lead to corruption, 
dishonesty and incompetence. This is especially important in the Pacific islands 
region (and indeed many developing countries) where the public sector is relatively 
large compared with the private sector. Gillett, Preston and Associates (2000b) in 
commenting on Papua New Guinea’s National Fisheries Authority say that there are 
insufficient internal and external controls applied; the licensing process is obscure, 
subject to manipulation and internal delays; record keeping is problematic; trust 
accounts are mismanaged; and influence rather than merit determine management 
decisions. Such lack of governance capacity not only leads to poor policy-making but 
also leads to substantially higher transaction costs for investment, discouraging both 
domestic and foreign investment. If the bureaucratic institutions are strong and 
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effective, and vice versa. 
 
The reliability and independence of the application of law is as important as the law 
itself (Toatu 2001). Moreover, a judiciary can only be reliable and independent if the 
rules and policies governing its operation are credible and if the resources allocated to 
it are adequate and efficient. Without a strong and consistent judiciary, the whole 
system of law collapses. A number of studies have highlighted the importance of law 
and order on economic performance in the Pacific (i.e, Chand and Levantis (1998) 
and Levantis (2000)). 
[Figure 2] 
These broad institutions for social and economic governance are critical for the 
economic performance of an economy. When they are weak, the effectiveness of the 
informal institutions and specific institutions for sectoral governance is significantly 
retarded. Informal and sector-specific institutions depend on the broader institutions 
for the provision of well functioning markets, low transactions costs for investment, 




The Pacific island countries’ struggle to maximise economic benefits from the 
valuable tuna stocks that migrate through ocean areas in their jurisdiction started in 
the 1970s when they first attempted to extract access fees from Japanese fishing 
fleets. Since that time, Korea, the Taiwanese Province of China, the United States and 
other distant water fishing nations have commenced fishing in the region, increasing 
competition for access. Now the Pacific island nations charge distant water fishing 
nations an average of four percent of net revenues for access to their waters. In 
reaction to such meager returns, the Pacific island countries adopted a new strategy in 
the 1990s of forcing domestication in the industry in an effort to duplicate distant 
water fishing nation activities. This domestication has taken on a number of forms 
such as investing in fishing vessels, building infrastructure for tuna processing, and 
transshipment. Many millions of dollars of public funds have been channeled into 
domestication. All but a very few ventures have failed, some repeatedly. 
 
This forced domestication of fishing activities is poor policy-making. It ignores the 
non-trivial economic principles of comparative advantage and the Tinbergen 
Principle. Although the Pacific island countries have close proximity to the valuable 
resource and low labour costs, the industry is characterised by large investment costs, 
specific skill requirements and high volatility in fish stocks and prices. It cannot be 
assumed that the Pacific island countries have comparative advantage in this industry. 
Governments should not favour the tuna industry over other activities, as it has by 
investing public funds so heavily in tuna ventures. Rather, public funds should be 
invested in supporting the private sector, by building infrastructure, establishing 
essential institutions for private sector activities, and enabling them to efficiently use 
information to independently seek out industries with comparative advantage. These 
poor policies are preventing the implementation of cost-effective institutions for the 
governance of the fishery. Institutions designed to maximise access fees (e.g., the 
auctioning of fishing rights) are being ignored due to policy designed to encouraged 
locally-based foreign direct investment through cheap access and the offer of side 
payments (i.e., bilateral aid) to resource managers. 
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While the importance of sound policy-making and the implementation of institutions 
for the governance of the fishery are necessary, they are not sufficient for fisheries 
development. Development of any sector in an economy needs to be coupled with 
strong institutions for broader economic and social governance: security of property 
and contractual rights, a competent and honest bureaucracy, and a reliable and 
independent judiciary. Without a strengthening of these broader institutions in the 
Pacific, individual sectors in an economy will be unable to fully develop. The full 
potential of the South Pacific tuna fishery (and indeed any of the Pacific’s natural and 
capital resources) will remain unrealised as private investors, local or foreign, will not 
have the security to invest and apply their skills and technology. 
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Figure 1  The South Pacific region: exclusive economic zones (Source: Secretariat of the Pacific Community) 
 



































(Adapted from Stoeckel (2001)) 
  17Footnotes 
 
1  No government has entered into a major joint venture with its own private 
sector (ADB 1997). 
 
2  For perspective, the Federated States of Micronesia GDP in 1995 was US$206 
million. 
 
3  The poor performance of STL has seen a steady decrease in penetration of 
canned tuna into the European Union market to the benefit of countries such as 
Thailand and the Philippines who do not possess advantages of abundant stocks of 
tuna in relatively close proximity or a 24 percent margin of preference under the 
Lomé Convention and Contonou Agreement. This trade preference has helped support 
a non-profitable industry. Global and regional trends (such as a decrease in preference 
to the European Union, low tuna prices and social unrest in 2000) and a diminishing 
reliance on Maruha and the Solomon Islands government for protection during lean 
periods has caused Maruha to leave the joint venture, offering a redundancy package 
to the small remaining active workforce (170) and the inactive workforce (1730). The 
company is now 51 percent owned by the national government through the 
Investment Corporation of the Solomon Islands and 49 percent owned by the Western 
Province government. The future of the company is still uncertain. It is argued that 
privatisation of the company will allow the development of a more productive and 
hence profitable company if comparative advantage in the industry exists. 
 
4  For a transshipment facility to be profitable, Schurman (1998) notes that it 
requires a large number of boats to support it, approximately 15 to 20. However, 
foreign boats are highly mobile which causes the Pacific Island countries to invest in 
their own longline fleets to decrease their risk of being left with an expensive 
servicing facility and no boats to service. 
 
5  For a review of institutional structures for fishery management see Petersen 
(2002). 
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